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NOTES
INTRASTATE BANISHMENT: AN
EXAMINATION AND ARGUMENT FOR
STRICT SCRUTINY OF JUDICIALLY AND
EXECUTIVELY IMPOSED BANISHMENT
ORDERS
INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2002, seventy-two year old Marjorie Benner
was found naked and dead in the bedroom of her Grays Harbor
County, Washington home.' The post-mortem medical examination
revealed no evidence of sexual assault but concluded that Benner had
died from asphyxia caused by strangulation.2 After a trial by jury,
Benner's forty-year-old neighbor, David Schimelpfenig, was
convicted of Benner's murder and the trial court imposed an
exceptional sentence of 400 months imprisonment based on its
conclusion that Benner was a "particularly vulnerable" victim. 3 As
part of its sentence, the trial court ordered that Schimelpfenig could
never again live in Grays Harbor County, nor have any contact with
Benner's family.4 Upon review however, a Washington appellate
court vacated the banishment order, concluding that it was overly
broad, and thereby impermissibly infringed upon Schimelpfenig's
I State v. Schimelpfenig, No. 31012-1-11, 2005 WL 1523678, at *** 4 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 29, 2005) (A partially published opinion can be found at 115 P.3d 338; however, the
published opinion does not contain a full reporting of the facts.).
2 Id.
3 Id. at ***8 Upon review, the appellate court vacated the exceptional sentence and
remanded the case to the trial court to impose a sentence in the statutorily approved range of 240
to 320 months.
4 State v. Schimelpfenig, 115 P.3d 338, 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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right to travel. 5 Importantly, the appellate court did not rule that
sentences imposing broad geographical restrictions are necessarily
inappropriate or unconstitutional, but simply found that the
geographical restrictions imposed on Schimelpfenig were
inappropriate given the factual circumstances of the case.6
In contrast, in Predick v. O'Connor,7 a Wisconsin appellate court
upheld an order prohibiting the defendant, O'Connor, from entering
Walworth County, Wisconsin. In Predick, the trial court had imposed
the order after finding that O'Connor repeatedly violated the terms of
a permanent harassment injunction, 8 which had been issued after
O'Connor had violated previous restraining orders by verbally
harassing Predick and allegedly using an automobile to run Predick
off the road. 9 The trial court determined that the banishment
injunction was appropriate because of O'Connor's past disregard for
previous, less restrictive orders, and because of the physical threat
that she posed.10 Ultimately, the appellate court determined that the
banishment order was "a proper exercise of discretion because it may
finally keep the tormentor at bay."'1'
Upon first glance, the above cases may appear incongruous. In
Schimelpfenig, the appellate court was unwilling to uphold an order
prohibiting a convicted murderer from living in the county in which
he had committed his crime. Schimelpfenig entered the home of his
seventy-two year old neighbor, who had routinely hired him to do
yard work,12 and strangled her with her own stockings, leaving her
dead and naked in her own bedroom. 13 The jury found Schimelpfenig
guilty of first-degree murder, yet the appellate court held that an order
prohibiting him from living in the county unconstitutionally infringed
on his rights. Conversely, in Predick, the appellate court upheld a
county-wide banishment order against a woman who was guilty only
of harassing a woman with whom she claimed to have been involved
in a romantic relationship, but did not physically harm.' 4 Thus, one
court was unwilling to banish a first-degree murderer from the county
in which he committed his crime, while the other upheld a
5 Id.
6 Id. at 341.
7 660 N.W.2d I (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
8 Id. at 2-5.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 2.
11 Id.
12 Schimelpfenig, 115 P.3d at 339.
13 State v. Schimelpfenig, No. 31012-1-11, 2005 WL 1523678, at ***4 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 29, 2005).
14 Predick, 660 N.W.2d at 3. O'Connor was also enjoined from contacting a fiend of
Predick whom O'Connor was convinced had become Predick's new lover. Id. at 4.
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county-wide banishment against a woman who had never physically
injured anyone. Upon closer reflection however, these holdings are
indeed consistent. In Predick, the banishment order was necessary
because previous, less restrictive orders failed to protect the
harassment victim. In Shimelpfenig, the offender was sentenced to a
lengthy term in prison and there was no showing that a further
banishment order was necessary to accomplish any valid state
interests.
Schimelpfenig and Predick are just two examples of a state
imposed order that is perhaps more common15 than one might expect:
banishment. For purposes of this Note, banishment is defined as "an
order which compels a person 'to quit a city, place, or county for a
specific period of time, or for life. ' "16 Intuitively, such an order seems
like a thing of the past, calling to mind the use of Australia as a home
for exiled criminals from the United Kingdom.' 7  However, as
communities deal with pervasive problems of gang violence, drug
abuse, prostitution, and sexual abuse, state legislatures have
increasingly explored legislation restricting where violators may live
and travel. 18 Such legislative acts expressly banishing offenders from
specified areas for specified acts are not the focus of this Note.
Instead, this Note is primarily concerned with banishment orders
exiling an individual from a specific geographic area within a state
(intrastate banishment) and that are not authorized by specific
legislation, but are instead issued at the discretion of a trial court or an
executive agency, such as a parole board. In fact, while legislative
enactments of geographical restrictions have increased, most
15 See, e.g, Jason S. Alloy, Note, "158-County Banishment" in Georgia: Constitutional
Implications Under the State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV.
1083, 1099 ("One prosecutor in DeKalb County, Georgia, has participated in over two hundred
cases in which the defendant was banished to Echols County.").
16 Reeves v. State, 5 S.W.3d 41, 45 (Ark. 1999) (quoting State v. Culp, 226 S.E.2d 841,
842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976)).
17 For an extended discussion of the historical roots of banishment, see Wm. Garth Snider,
Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition Under the First
Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455,458-465 (1998).
IS For discussions of various legislative efforts to deal with these problems by
implementing geographical restrictions, see Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711 (2005) (analyzing legislative
efforts to restrict where convicted sex offenders may live); Robert L. Scharff, Comment, An
Analysis of Municipal Drug and Prostitution Exclusion Zones, 15 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS.
L.J. 321, 323-324 (2005) (analyzing legislation that establishes exclusion zones that "punish the
otherwise innocent presence of an individual who is in an exclusion zone, simply because that
person has been charged with committing a prohibited act in an exclusion zone at some point in
the past"); Stephanie Smith, Comment, Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing
Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (2000) (scrutinizing an
ordinance in Cicero, Illinois, banishing from Cicero any gang member found by a
preponderance of the evidence to have engaged in gang activity).
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banishment orders are actually issued as conditions of probation or
parole.19
Many jurisdictions have not confronted the issue of judicially or
executively imposed banishment orders.20 Among those jurisdictions
that have considered the issue, the jurisprudence concerning
banishment varies. For example, at least fifteen states, including
Ohio, have expressly prohibited banishment from the state (interstate
banishment).21 Even where there is no such prohibition within the
state constitution, most courts have invalidated interstate banishment
orders on the grounds that such orders violate public policy by
impermissibly dumping convicts on other states.22 However, while
most states agree that interstate banishment is impermissible, the
states disagree about intrastate banishment. Courts that have
considered the issue often hold that banishment orders are either per
se violations of public policy, 23 or that they violate the statutory law
supposedly authorizing the given banishment order.24 At the same
time, a number of courts have upheld the validity of such orders. 5
Some courts that have upheld banishment explicitly recognize that
such orders implicate important policy and constitutional issues.
Thus, while ultimately upholding the banishment order in question,
19 Snider, supra note 17, at 456.
20 See Smith, supra note 18, at 1481 n.142 (citing a number of jurisdictions that, to the
author's knowledge, had not addressed the issue).
21 Snider, supra note 17, at 465 n.70.
22 See Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979) ("To permit
one state to dump its convict criminals into another is not in the interests of safety and welfare;
therefore, the punishment by banishment to another state is prohibited by public policy."); see
also People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930) (holding that interstate banishment is
"impliedly prohibited by public policy" because such orders "would tend to incite dissension,
provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental equality of political rights among the several
States which is the basis of the Union itself').
23 See Crabtree v. State, 112 P.3d 618, 622 (Wyo, 2005) (overturning banishment from
county after concluding that county-wide banishment implicates the same public policy
concerns as interstate banishment because "banishment from an entire county win incite
dissention and provoke retaliation among counties just as it would among states").
24 See State v. Muhammad, 43 P.3d 318, 324 (Mont. 2002), affd, 121 P.3d 521 (Mont.
2005) (overturning banishment from county on grounds that sentencing court did not comply
with the statutory parameters governing sentencing).
25 See United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (upholding probation
condition requiring defendant to stay out of Fulton County, Georgia for two years); State v.
Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1997) (upholding condition of two-year probation
prohibiting defendant from entering the Evergreen or Bergen Park areas); State v. Collett, 208
S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 1974) (upholding the suspension of sentence conditioned upon the banishment
of defendant from seven counties); State v. Nienhardt, 537 N.W.2d 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
(upholding trial courts decision to stay sentence of sixty days in jail and instead place defendant
on probation during which time defendant was prohibited from entering city where violations
occurred); see also Smith supra note 18, at 1481 n.143 (documenting that Alabama, Alaska,
California, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oregon, and Texas have all upheld
intrastate banishment orders in either practice or theory).
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the court in Predick noted, "[t]he knee jerk reaction is that this kind of
order is arbitrary at the very least and an invasion of a person's
constitutional right to travel at the most. ' 26 Still other courts have
upheld banishment without raising any constitutional considerations
and have simply applied an abuse of discretion review of the lower
court's order.27 Thus, "the jurisprudence in the area of banishment is
woefully lacking a coherent theme. 28
This Note examines the jurisprudence concerning intrastate
banishment orders imposed in the context of probation and parole in
an effort to provide a coherent framework for reviewing such orders.
Ultimately, this Note argues that judicially and executively imposed
banishment orders infringe upon the constitutional right of intrastate
travel and should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny rather than the
abuse of discretion standard many courts apply when reviewing such
orders. By applying strict scrutiny, reviewing courts can best ensure
that individual rights are not improperly infringed upon, while at the
same time leave available a potentially effective tool to help
rehabilitate offenders and protect communities. Additionally, strict
scrutiny is warranted to minimize an intrinsic public policy problem
created by banishment orders: such orders necessarily impose a
burden on communities outside the banishment area, and are thus
liable to provoke inter-community dissension and retaliation.
Judicially and executively imposed banishment has received
limited scholarly attention.29 Among those scholars who have written
on the issue, most have argued for prohibiting or limiting its use.
30
Part I of this Note provides a broad historical overview of banishment
and suggests that its ancient roots create an association with the
distant, less civilized past, thereby causing many to feel intuitively
suspicious when banishment is employed today. Part 1(A) of this
Note examines the common justifications for banishment orders and
argues that while the justifications for banishment are certainly
26 Predick, 660 N.w.2d at 2; see also Schimelpfenig, 115 P.3d at 339 (noting the
constitutional implications of the banishment order at issue).
27 Cothran, 855 F.2d 750 (denying motion to correct a banishment sentence).
26 Snider, supra note 17, at 475.
29 Id. at 456 (noting the lack of scholarly attention to banishment orders and attributing
this fact to the discretionary nature of such orders).
30 See id. (arguing that banishment is a per se violation of the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of association); see also Alloy, supra note 15 (arguing that certain
banishment orders common in the State of Georgia violate both the Georgia and Federal
Constitutions); Michael F. Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Ill U. PA.
L. REV. 758 (1962-1963) (arguing that banishment serves no social value and is so cruel that it
is in fact unconstitutional). But see Michael George Smith, The Propriety and Usefulness of
Geographical Restrictions Imposed as Conditions of Probation, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 571 (1995)
(arguing that banishment serves legitimate state interests and should not be subject to strict
scrutiny).
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debatable, banishment can in fact serve a valid penological purpose.
Part 1(B) then examines whether courts and executive agencies have
the authority to banish individuals. After concluding that banishment
orders are in fact permissible, Part I examines the level of scrutiny
that reviewing courts have and should apply to banishment. Part
Ill(A) examines banishment conditions that are voluntarily agreed to
and concludes that such agreements are no basis for removing
banishment orders from judicial scrutiny. Part II(B) then examines
the various types of review that courts have applied to banishment
orders. Finally, Part Ill(C) examines whether there is a constitutional
right to intrastate travel and concludes that because such a right does
exist, all banishment orders must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Because banishment orders necessarily infringe upon the right of
intrastate travel, and because such orders implicate important policy
concerns regarding inter-local dumping of criminals, banishment
orders should at all times be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The practice of banishing individuals from a community is by no
means a modern invention. As one court has noted, "[b]anishment as
a punishment has existed throughout the world since ancient times. 31
In fact, scholars posit that banishment was used by the earliest human
social groups as a powerful tool for maintaining order: formal or
informal banishment would naturally serve as a powerful deterrent
because expulsion from a social group could be devastating where
membership in such a group was so important for survival.32 In more
organized societies, banishment was codified as a sanctioned form of
punishment in such early legal systems as the Code of Hammurabi in
Babylon, the Laws of Manu in India, the T'ang Code in China, and
Mosaic Law and Talmudic legal systems.3 Banishment was also
endorsed by Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics, and scholars have
shown that banishment was employed by the Athenians in Ancient
Greece, as well as by Germanic peoples in the Middle Ages.34
Perhaps more familiar to Americans is the British use of banishment
as a major penological tool when the United Kingdom enacted the
Transportation Act of 1718. Under this Act and those that followed,
the British could exile both capital and non-capital offenders to the
31 Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979) (holding that
banishment as part of a plea bargain was void).
32 Snider, supra note 17, at 459.
33 Id. at 459-60.
34 Id. at 460.
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Americas and Australia. One scholar estimates that between 1720 and
1765, close to 50,000 British subjects were banished to the
Americas.35 According to this scholar, the "overriding purpose [of the
banishment policy] was neither rehabilitation nor deterrence, but
ridding Britain of dangerous offenders. 36
As one may expect, banishment has also been used as a political
tool to preserve the authority of existing governments. Leaders have
long exiled political rivals or dissenters as a means of preserving their
own power. Just as early proto-social groups likely banished members
for unforgivable offenses, it seems logical that leaders of such groups
also banished those who unsuccessfully attempted to supplant them or
who espoused threatening ideas. In more formally organized
societies, political exile was employed by Ancient Greek city-states to
exile citizens whom the Assembly deemed to be a threat to the
political stability of the state.37 Banishment was also used more
recently in Europe and the United Kingdom as a tool for handling
political agitators. For example, scholars have noted that a large
percentage of convicts exiled to Australia were in fact Irish
nationalists who protested British rule.3 8 To cite another example,
Russia long employed banishment as a method of political control,
with Siberia the favored destination for exiles. Such banishment was
officially adopted in Russia by the Code of Punishment of 1845,
though it had been utilized as early as the sixteenth century. 39 Though
this policy was officially abolished in 1917 after the Revolution,
banishment of political dissenters was widely employed under the
reign of Joseph Stalin.4°
In the United States, banishment was imposed in colonial times as
a means of expelling unwanted individuals from colonies. 4' That the
colonies would utilize banishment is hardly surprising considering its
widespread practice throughout the British Empire. Thus, at the time
of the founding of the United States, it seems that banishment was
hardly an uncommon tool for dealing with criminals and other
unwanted citizens. For example, there is evidence showing that when
35 Id. at 462.
36 Id. (quoting A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA. THE TRANSPORTATION OF
BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES 1718-1775, 2-3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987)).
37 Id. at 463 (discussing banishment tactics of various city-states).
38 Id. at 464 (citing A.G.L. SHAW, CONVICTS AND THE COLONIES 166 (Oxford Univ. Press
1966)).
39 Id.(noting the banishment of political prisoners).
40 Id. at 465.
41 Matthew D. Borrelli, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public Policy Arguments
Against This Revived Ancient Punishment, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2003) (citing
JAMES GRAHAME, THE GREAT REPUBLIC BY THE MASTER HISTORIANS 92-93 (Hubert H.
Bancroft, 1901)).
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Georgia became an independent state, banishment was not considered
to be a form of cruel and unusual punishment.42 That strongly
suggests that it was not particularly uncommon, and was in fact a
relatively accepted part of the penological systems of the early United
States. This conclusion is bolstered by an early Supreme Court
decision, which held that "[t]he right to confiscate and banish, in the
case of an offending citizen, must belong to every government. It is
not within the judicial power, as created and regulated by the
constitution of Georgia: and it naturally, as well as tacitly, belongs to
the legislature., 43 One author has pointed to this holding as standing
for the proposition that banishment is "per se violative of public
policy."44 On its face however, the Court's statement indicates that
banishment was recognized as a legitimate exercise of governmental
authority.
The point of this cursory outline of the historical use of
banishment is to provide a context by which to view banishment as it
is employed today. Sociologists have long noted that the manner in
which a society punishes its criminals reflects the deep structures and
values of that society. As the Sociologist David Garland has argued,
"[p]unishment . . . can be viewed as a complex cultural artifact,
encoding the signs and symbols of the wider culture in its own
practices. '' 5 Accordingly, cultural norms determine what constitutes a
"civilized punishment," and how we punish our criminals reflects
what we, as a society, deem to be civilized and humane.46 As cultural
norms change over time, so too do the types of punishments that we
employ. Moreover, the fact that we punish our criminals differently
today than we did in the past symbolizes how we, as a society, have
changed. That we no longer execute criminals in the open common
signifies for many that we have become more civilized than our
predecessors (if not simply more squeamish). Thus, the fact that
banishment was a historically widespread form of punishment does
not dictate that it comports with modern sensibilities and cultural
norms. It is perhaps our notion of banishment as an "ancient
' 47
punishment that makes us automatically suspicious when it is
42 State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga. 1974) (citing WALTER MCELRETH, ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA 442 (Harrison Co. 1912)).
43 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 20 (1800) (Cushing, J.).
4 Snider, supra note 17, at 469.
45 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY
198 (Univ. of Chicago 1990).
46 See id. at 195-96.
47 See Borrelli, supra note 41. The fact that Borrelli refers to banishment as an "ancient"
punishment in his title arguably foreshadows his argument that it should be abolished in modem
penology.
[Vol. 57:4
INTRASTATE BANISHMENT
employed today. However, it is important to resist any snap
judgments about banishment based solely upon its historical use. We
should instead first recognize that banishment, as it is employed
today, is both a product and reflection of our present cultural patterns
and then objectively determine if, and how, banishment should be
employed in our modern legal system.
II. PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY
It is a simple fact of American life that there are not enough prison
beds to house all the criminals eligible for imprisonment. As one
scholar has noted, "[b]ecause our existing prisons are so greatly
overcrowded, expensive, and inadequate .... our system of criminal
justice will inevitably be forced to use non-incarcerative means to
deal with non-violent and, in some cases, moderately violent
criminals over the next decade. 48 Additionally, as crime and
recidivism occur at unacceptably high levels, despite the increased
incarceration of criminals, many have questioned the efficacy and
rationale of imprisonment. 49 Probation and parole have been, and will
continue to be, one of the most heavily relied upon tools used by the
criminal justice system to cope with the reality of prison
overcrowding. 50 Banishment, as it is employed today, is generally
either imposed as a condition of parole or probation. 5' By its very
nature, banishment, as an alternative to the prison system, saves the
state a considerable amount of money. Accordingly, banishment has
the potential to help relieve the stress on the prison system at a
relatively low cost.
A. Purpose
In evaluating the legitimacy of banishment orders as a whole, it is
important to consider whether banishment orders serve legitimate
governmental purposes. Because banishment orders are most
commonly employed within a penological system, a key issue is
whether banishment furthers an accepted penological purpose. More
specifically, can banishment be justified under theories of
rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation?
48 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 1-3 (West 2d ed. 1999).
49 GARLAND, supra note 45, at 4; see also COHEN, supra note 48, at 1-2 (noting that
people have questioned prisons as either breeding grounds for more crime, or overly lenient
country clubs).
so See COHEN, supra note 48, at 1-2 n.2 (noting a tripling of both the probation and parole
populations between 1980 and 1997).
5' See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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1. Rehabilitation
A common requirement of probationary conditions is that they
promote the rehabilitation of the offender. A number of courts have
struck down probationary banishment conditions under the theory that
52such conditions do not adequately serve rehabilitative purposes. For
example, courts have emphasized that removing an offender from the
county in which his family lives is not rehabilitative,53 while others
have emphasized that banishing a broke and unemployed offender
from a county does not reasonably promote the rehabilitation of that
offender.54 Central to this line of thinking is the notion that
rehabilitating an offender necessitates active oversight by the
punishing community. Indeed as one scholar has stated,
"[r]ehabilitation necessarily presupposes that the banishing
community intends to act proactively to aid offenders. 55 If
rehabilitation requires oversight and active steps by the community,
critics argue that simply expelling an individual from a community
cannot have a rehabilitative effect.
Certainly, there are better ways to rehabilitate a criminal than
banishment. Drug treatment and job training programs are
presumably more effective ways of inculcating character traits and
skills that will help criminals avoid a recidivist cycle. However, such
rehabilitation programs are both scarce and expensive, and thus do
little to relieve over-stressed penal systems. Moreover, just because
there are better rehabilitative methods does not dictate that
banishment is without rehabilitative value. If the goal of rehabilitation
is to help offenders from repeating their crimes, it seems clear that
removing an offender from the environment in which he or she
committed or learned criminal behavior can help keep that offender
from repeating that behavior. The Third Circuit found this logic
compelling in upholding a banishment order against an offender who
grew up surrounded by drugs and prostitution and who had a history
of criminal activity in the two counties from which she was
banished.56 According to the court, the banishment order was "clearly
52 See State v. McCreary, 582 So. 2d 425, 428 (Miss. 1991) (noting that banishment
"struggles to serve any rehabilitative purpose"); Edison v. State, 709 P.2d 510, 511 (Alaska CL
App. 1985) (overturning banishment because it did not comply with state requirement that all
probation conditions reasonably relate to rehabilitating the offender).
53 State v. Muhammad, 43 P.3d 318, 323-24 (Mont. 2002).
54 Johnson v. State, 672 S.w.2d 621,623 (Tex. App. 1984).
55 Snider, supra note 17, at 478.
56 United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 289 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that the banishment
was related to the defendant's history, was not greater than necessary, and was consistent with
public policy).
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intended to promote [the defendant's] rehabilitation by keeping her
away from the influences that would most likely cause her to engage
in further criminal activity.
57
Rehabilitation rests on the theory that offenders can acquire new
character traits and skills that will enable them to function lawfully in
society. Promoters of rehabilitation recognize that environmental
factors shape behavior and rehabilitation can best be accomplished in
a rehabilitative environment. Drug treatment and job training
programs function by placing individuals in environments that
promote sobriety and emphasize the value of work. Just as adding
positive environmental factors can foster rehabilitation, so can
removing negative environmental factors. Moreover, while it is true
that offenders may slip into criminal activity in their new
communities, it may be more difficult for them to engage in such
activity absent the criminal network they previously relied upon. As
the District Attorney for the county of Houston, Georgia has written
in explaining his policy of seeking to banish drug dealers from his
jurisdiction, "it will be much more difficult for [a drug dealer] to start
from scratch elsewhere. 58
2. Deterrence
A common justification for criminal sentences is that such
punishment has a deterrent effect on future criminality. A punishment
deters future crime to the extent that individuals are aware that they
may receive that punishment and refrain from engaging in criminal
behavior in order to avoid that punishment. Whether banishment
serves as a deterrent depends on the extent to which individuals are
aware that it is a potential consequence of criminal activity, the extent
to which an individual values being able to reside in or visit a given
locality, and the extent to which the areas to which an individual may
be banished are undesirable.59
The extent to which individuals are aware that banishment is a
potential consequence of criminal activity is difficult to ascertain.
Where banishment is infrequently employed, it seems doubtful that
many people are aware of its use. However, in areas where
banishment is more commonly used,60 it is plausible that would-be
offenders are aware that their actions may cause them to be expelled
57 Id. at 292.
58 Kelly R. Burke, Banishment from Houston County (2006), http://www.houstonda.org/
Houston DA NewstHoustonCountyLawSchool/Banishment fromHoustonCounty (last
visited January 12, 2006).
59 Snider, supra note 17, at 480.
60 See supra note 13.
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from a given area. In Houston County, Georgia, the District Attorney
has posted an article on the Office of the District Attorney website
explaining why he continually seeks to banish drug dealers from
Houston County.6' Considering that banishing drug dealers is the
stated policy of the county, it seems highly probable that drug dealers
in Houston County are aware that their actions may result in
banishment.
The deterrent potential of banishment likewise depends on "factors
that are variable to the region of banishment and idiosyncratic to the
individual. 62 The economic prospects of the banishing area in
relation to surrounding areas, coupled with a given individual's
attachment to a community, will substantially affect the deterrent
impact of banishment orders.63 However, it seems clear that so long
as an individual has either an economic or emotional tie to an area,
the prospect of banishment from that area is capable of affecting a
deterrent influence on that individual. While it has been suggested
that criminals are inherently unaffected by social pressures and are
thereby able to commit socially repugnant acts,64 this argument does
not dictate that would-be offenders cannot be deterred by threat of
banishment. Just because an individual is tempted to flout certain
rules and norms of a community does not mean that individual is
willing to forgo membership in that community altogether.
3. Retribution
Another possible justification for a banishment sentence is that
banishment can serve as a form of punishment by forcing an offender
to pay a significant price for his or her transgression. 65 Because most
banishment orders are issued as conditions of probation or parole, to
withstand judicial scrutiny, such banishment orders must comply with
the statutory purposes of probation. The most commonly recognized
purposes of probation are to rehabilitate the offender and to protect
the public.66 However, some probationary statutes explicitly allow
probationary conditions to have punishment as an objective,67 while
others have such broad language that punishment could logically fall
61 See Burke, supra note 58.
62 Snider, supra note 17, at 481.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See Smith, supra note 30, at 573-82 (arguing that courts should consider the punitive
nature of probation when evaluating the legitimacy of banishment orders imposed as conditions
of probation).
6 Id. at 574 (citing Johnson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App. 1984), People v.
Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
67 Id. at 577-78 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 42.12, § 1 (a) (Vernon 1994)).
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under the gambit of the statute's legislative purpose.68 Where
probationary statutes recognize punishment of the offender as a
legitimate goal of probation, courts should clearly weigh the punitive
value of a banishment order in determining whether to issue such an
order, or whether to uphold the order upon judicial review. Moreover,
it is also worth recognizing that probation itself can be viewed as a
form of punishment.69 If probation is itself a punishment, it is only
logical that probationary conditions can serve punitive purposes.
4. Incapacitation
A common requirement of probationary conditions is that they
promote public safety. v In a very real sense, banishing an individual
from a geographical locality protects that locality from further
criminal transgressions committed by the offender. Moreover, a
surviving victim of a crime would certainly feel safer knowing that
the perpetrator is prohibited from entering the community for a
specific period of time. Indeed banishment orders have been imposed
and upheld on the theory that the orders are necessary to protect a
victim from further contact with his or her transgressor.7 ' In cases
where a defendant has targeted a specific individual for harassment or
violence, the protection of that specific victim is paramount. While an
order prohibiting an offender from contacting a victim may protect
that victim while at home or work, it would not protect the victim as
effectively when in a public space. Absent imprisonment, a
banishment order may be the best way to prevent victims and their
transgressors from coming into contact with each other, inadvertently
or otherwise. Additionally, the wider community may well feel safer
knowing that criminals who have perpetrated crimes within their
borders are not free to walk the streets of their community.
68 Id. at 577 (arguing that language in the California probation statute authorizing
conditions designed "to protect the public to the end that justice may be done" can be read as
recognizing punishment as a legitimate goal of a probationary condition (quoting In re White,
158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979))).
69 See id. at 578-82 (noting that while some jurisdictions do not view probation as a type
of criminal sentence, the federal probation statute and the Supreme Court recognize that
probation is a form of punishment).
70 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-202(1)(e) (1997) (authorizing probationary
conditions "reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim
and society"); Johnson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App. 1984) (holding that
probationary conditions "must have a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and
the protection of the public").
71 See Predick 660 N.W.2d at 2 (upholding banishment from county where previous, less
restrictive restraining orders failed to protect victim from further harassment); People v.
Brockleman, 933 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1997) (upholding banishment order against defendant who
had twice beaten his girlfriend because it was designed to prevent the possibility that the
defendant could contact his victim).
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Arguably, protecting the banishing community is the primary
justification for banishment orders.72 However, a powerful critique of
banishment is that it protects one community at the expense of others.
In fact, courts have cited this as reason for invalidating banishment
orders. While it is no doubt true that banishment orders burden
surrounding communities with convicted criminals, it is not always
true that these surrounding communities will be exposed to more
crime. For example, in the case of domestic violence or criminal
harassment, the object of the offender's abuse tends to be a specific
individual. Though the offender may pose a significant threat to that
individual, it does not follow that the offender poses a significant
threat to citizens more generally. Banishing an offender from the
community in which the victim resides may thus go far to protect that
victim without necessarily imposing a threat on outlying areas. The
same may be true, though to a lesser degree, when drug dealers are
banished from the areas in which they sell drugs. While drug dealers
may possess characteristics that make them dangerous on a general
level, drug dealing requires a social network of both suppliers and
consumers. Removing a dealer from his or her social network can
therefore largely impede his or her ability to successfully deal drugs.
73
Although a resourceful individual may certainly be able to establish a
criminal network in a new community, it would no doubt be more
difficult.
B. Authority
In Cooper v. Telfair, the Supreme Court stated emphatically that
the power to banish rests in the legislature.74 In a more contemporary
holding, another court has held that "the power to banish, if it exists at
all, is a power vested in the Legislature and certainly where such
methods of punishment are not authorized by statute, it is impliedly
prohibited by public policy. '75 William Garth Snider has noted that
no state statute has specifically authorized banishment as a judicial
76sentence. Snider takes this fact and argues that under Cooper courtsand parole boards do not have the power to impose banishments
72 See Snider, supra note 17, at 483 (opining that "physical protection is the justification
that is the main driving force behind banishment").
73 See Burke, supra note 58.
74 See supra text accompanying note 43.
75 Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979).
76 Snider, supra note 17, at 466. However, as noted previously, a number of states have
enacted statutes that authorize specific geographical restrictions for offenses such as
prostitution, drug dealing, and sexual predation. Snider is correct though, in the sense that no
state legislature has specifically authorized banishment as an available punishment for general
criminal offenses.
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conditions upon parolees and probationers. 7 However, it is not at all
clear that Cooper is applicable to state imposed banishment orders,
nor that it is even still good law. In Cooper, the state of Georgia
confiscated the property of the plaintiff, who no longer resided in
Georgia, under a law passed during the Revolutionary War
authorizing confiscation of property belonging to citizens that took up
arms with the British against the American revolutionaries.78 The
Court upheld the constitutionality of this law and the confiscation of
the plaintiff's property. Of the four Justices who wrote brief opinions,
only two mentioned the power of the legislature to confiscate
property and banish citizens. Justices Patterson and Cushing
emphasized that the Georgia legislature had passed a statute
authorizing confiscation and that it was beyond the judicial power to
overturn the law when the power to banish rests inherently in the
legislative body of any government.
79
There are a number of reasons to doubt the applicability of this
holding today. Importantly, this case did not actually involve a
banishment order, but merely a confiscation of property. Thus, the
Justices' statements concerning banishment are in fact dicta.
Moreover, with four Justices writing separately, statements by
individual Justices can hardly be seen as speaking for the entire
Court. Additionally, the law at issue was passed in 1782, and at least
one Justice did not inquire into the issue of banishment at all, but
instead questioned whether the Constitution authorized the Court to
pass judgment on laws enacted prior to ratification.80 Most important
of all, however, the United States Constitution does not speak to the
allocation of power within state governments. In Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh,8' the Court held that in regards to the power of a state
over its political subdivisions, "[i]n all these respects the state is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state
Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States." 82 Hunter tells us that political
subdivisions exist at the pleasure of the state and have no rights
stemming from the federal Constitution as against the state. Most
importantly, Hunter states emphatically that the Constitution does not
have authority over the organization of power within a state. Thus,
77 Id. at 469-71.
78 Cooper, 4 U.S. at 14.
79 Id. at 19-20.
80 Id. (Chase, J.).
81 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
8 Id. at 179.
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despite the dictum in Cooper, the Constitution has nothing to say
about where, within a state government, the power to banish resides.
Hunter also sheds light on the argument that intrastate banishment
orders are prohibited by public policy. In People v. Baum,83 the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that interstate banishment is
"impliedly prohibited by public policy" because "[i]t would tend to
incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental
equality of political rights among the several States which is the basis
of the Union itself."84 Indeed, interstate banishment does offend the
structure of the Union, which recognizes each state as a separate
sovereign. State sovereignty is offended when one state is effectively
able to force another state to house its unwanted citizens. Although an
individual state could arguably protect its sovereignty via legislation
prohibiting individuals banished from other states from entering or
residing in that state, the fact of interstate banishment still offends
notions of sovereignty by effectively forcing neighboring states to
either house unwanted criminals or pass a specific type of legislation.
However, this problem does not exist in the case of intrastate
banishment. As Hunter tells us, local political subdivisions are agents
of the state that exist entirely at the state's discretion.85 State political
subdivisions are not independent sovereigns; therefore, the structure
of the federal government is not offended when one city or county
banishes an individual from its limits. While intrastate banishment
may implicate concerns regarding inter-local dissension and
retaliation, it does not offend the federal Constitution. So long as
intrastate banishment orders are authorized under state law and do not
otherwise violate the state or federal Constitution, such orders are not
prohibited by public policy.
As the above discussion indicates, the threshold question in
analyzing banishment orders is whether the court or executive agency
has the authority to impose such conditions. As previously noted,
some courts have held that absent a specific legislative authorization
of banishment, such conditions violate public policy and are therefore
beyond the power of a court or parole board.86 However, while no
statutes explicitly authorize banishment from a large geographical
area, such as a county or a state, there are a number of states that
specifically authorize geographic restrictions as conditions of
83 231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930).
4 Id. at 96.
85 Hunter, 207 U.S at 179.
86 See Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 960-61 n.6 (Mass. 1998) (citing
Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979); State v. Doughtie, 74
S.E. 2d 922, 923 (N.C. 1953); State v. Charlton, 846 P.2d 341, 343 (N.M. Ct. App. 1002)).
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probation and parole. 87 Because a banishment order is simply one
type of geographical restriction, probation and parole statutes that
explicitly authorize geographic restrictions implicitly authorize
banishment orders as well. For example, Congress has specifically
granted federal courts the authority to require probationers to "reside
in a specified place or area, or refrain from residing in a specified
place or area.,88 A banishment order is essentially an order
commanding an individual not to reside in a specific place. Thus, in
federal courts, and in those states with statutes expressly authorizing
geographical restrictions, courts clearly have the authority, expressly
granted through the legislature, to impose banishment orders.
Most jurisdictions do not have statutes specifically authorizing
geographic restrictions as conditions of probation or parole.
Typically, these jurisdictions instead grant courts and executive
agencies broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions that
promote the purposes of probation. As discussed in Part HI(A) of this
Note, the predominant goals of probation and parole are rehabilitating
the defendant and adequately ensuring public safety.89 In these
jurisdictions, banishment orders may be issued so long as they
comport with purposes of probation or parole and the terms of the
general grant of authority. Courts and executive agencies have the
authority to impose reasonable conditions: thus, they have the
authority to impose banishment orders so long as they are reasonably
related to the goals of probation. 90 A court does not need a specific
grant authorizing banishment as a condition of probation or parole.
Thus, for example, according to the Illinois Supreme Court,
"[a]lthough [a] banishment condition of probation is not expressly
provided for by statute, it may, nonetheless, be a constitutionally valid
condition of probation." 91 This power exists because "courts have
broad discretion to impose probation conditions, whether expressly
87 See COHEN, supra note 48, at 10-12 n.1 (citing statutes in Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Texas).
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(13) (2000) (amended 2002, 2006).
89 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-202(l)(f) (2005) (granting sentencing judge the
authority to impose "any other limitation reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation
and the protection of the victim and society").
90 See COHEN, supra note 48, at 10-14 (noting that restrictions on offenders' freedom of
movement are generally upheld so long as they reasonable); see also In re J.w., 787 N.E.2d
747, 763-64 (111. 2003), cert denied, J.W. v. Ill., 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6980 (Oct. 6, 2003)
(overturning a probation condition banishing a juvenile sex offender from the community and
noting that "when deciding the propriety of a condition of probation imposed in a particular
case, whether explicitly statutory or not, the overriding concern is reasonableness").
91 In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 763.
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allowed by statute or not, to achieve the goals of fostering
rehabilitation and protecting the public."
92
At this point, it is important to note that not all banishment orders
are imposed as condition of probation or parole.93 Although other
kinds of orders are uncommon, it is worth examining a few examples
that do exist. In Doe v. City of Lafayette,94 a federal district court in
Indiana upheld an order issued by the city Park's department
permanently banning the defendant from all of the city's parks. The
defendant was a convicted sexual offender who had served four years
of house arrest and four years of probation for attempted child
molestation.95 Although he was no longer on probation, he was
banished from the parks when his former probation officer discovered
that he had visited a park and experienced sexual fantasies about the
children he was watching.96 Importantly, the Park's Department was a
statutorily created entity vested with the power to establish rules for
the city's parks and recreational facilities.97 The court upheld the
order as a valid exercise of governmental police powers because
"[g]enerally, states are free to impose restrictions that have a rational
relation to the goal of public safety."98 Although the court expressed
concerns about the process by which the city imposed the ban,
because the defendant did not raise any procedural due process
arguments, 99 the court upheld the ban as a rational use of the general
welfare power of the state to protect public safety.
In Predick v. O'Connor, °0 as part of an injunction order, the trial
court banished the defendant from an entire county for an indefinite
period of time. 10 1 The appellate court upheld the banishment order
against the defendant who had repeatedly harassed the plaintiffs and
disregarded previous, less restrictive injunction orders. 10 2 However,
the court did not address the source of the trial court's authority to
issue such an order. The appellate court simply assumed that the trial
court had such authority and instead limited its review to issues
92 Id.
93 Again, this note does not address in depth the statutory geographical restrictions
referred to supra note 18.
94 160 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ind. 2001).
95 Id. at 997.
96 Id. The defendant told his sex offenders anonymous group about the incident, and the
probation officer learned about it from an anonymous source. When the Park's superintendent
learned about the incident, the department issued the banishment order. Id. at 998.
9 Id. at n.1.
98 Id. at 999.
Id. at n.2.
100 660 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
101 See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
1t2Id.
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regarding whether the defendant's constitutional rights were infringed
and whether the injunction was properly tailored. The appellate
court's indifference to the trial court's source of authority may
nevertheless be explained by the fact that the banishment injunction
was issued pursuant to a Wisconsin statute authorizing harassment
injunctions. 10 3 Under Wisconsin jurisprudence, a trial court has broad
discretion to determine the scope of an injunction. 1°4 The Predick
court presumably found that the trial court had authority to issue the
banishment order as part of its discretionary power to fashion
injunctive relief.
The discretionary nature of most probation and parole statutes,
taken together with Predick and Doe, indicate that where there is a
broad scope of authority, be it inherent in the general welfare power
of government or granted by legislation, executive agencies and the
courts have the authority to issue banishment orders. Because
banishment is a severe punishment, the notion that it should only be
employed where expressly authorized by legislative authority is
appealing. However, there is nothing to compel the conclusion that
banishment must be expressly authorized by legislative action. The
only Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject came in 1800 and
is of dubious precedential value. 105 As noted earlier, banishment has a
longstanding historical tradition that continued through the founding
of the United States. Although fifteen state constitutions have
prohibited banishment from the state,' °6 most state constitutions are
silent on the subject. Where state legislatures have spoken on the
subject of geographical restrictions, they have tended to authorize
them through their probation statutes, or the increasing use of
geographical restrictions on sex offenders, prostitutes, and drug
dealers. 107 Most state legislatures have granted sentencing courts and
executive agencies wide discretion to fashion conditions that further
the objectives of probation and parole. In certain circumstances,
banishment orders may well serve these purposes. The trend towards
increasing legislation authorizing geographical restrictions, as well as
the historical use of banishment, suggests that courts should have the
authority to impose such conditions when granted broad discretion by
their legislatures. Rather than handcuff these institutions by requiring
an explicit legislative grant of banishment authority, the better view is
103 Predick, 660 N.W.2d at 5. The trial court issued the injunction pursuant to Wis. STAT. §
813.125.
104 In re Paternity of C.A.S., 518 N.w.2d 283, 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
105 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 21.
'07 See supra note 18.
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that courts and executive agencies have such power when they are
granted discretionary powers.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BANISHMENT ORDERS
It is one thing to recognize that courts and executive agencies have
the authority to impose banishment orders. It is quite another thing to
uphold the orders themselves. Regardless of whether or not one feels
banishment orders are appropriate in modem penology, it seems clear
that if trial courts and executive agencies are going to issue such
orders, they should be reviewed carefully under a consistent standard
of review. Unfortunately, courts have varied substantially in the
standard of review they employ when adjudicating the validity of
banishment orders. In particular, the courts disagree as to whether or
not such orders must be reviewed for their constitutional validity.
This section explores the standards of review variously employed by
courts and argues that because banishment infringes the constitutional
right to travel, courts should employ some form of strict scrutiny
when analyzing banishment orders.
A. Voluntary Agreements
At the onset, it is important to note that banishment conditions are
more often overturned than upheld by reviewing courts. 0 8 Because
most banishment orders are issued as conditions of probation or
parole, these orders must comply with the requirements of the
authorizing probation and parole statutes. Interestingly, when
banishment orders are imposed as conditions of parole, they are more
likely to be upheld by a reviewing court. 1°9 The logic for upholding
such banishment orders rests on the notion that parole is an act of
grace conferred upon the parolee that the parolee is free to accept or
reject."' In Dougan v. Brownlee,"' the Supreme Court of Arkansas
upheld a parole condition banishing the convicted offender from an
entire county. Although the Arkansas constitution prohibited
banishment from the state,' 1 2 and judicial precedent had overturned
interstate banishment as a condition of probation,1 3 the court upheld
08 See COHEN, supra note 48, at 10-16 (noting that banishment conditions are "usually,
but not always, invalidated").109See Snider, supra note 17, at 471 (noting that banishment as a parole condition is
generally upheld because "[m]ost jurisdictions have held that any condition, so long as it is not
illegal, immoral, or impossible to perform, may be attached to a parole or pardon.").
110 d. at 472.
111 No. 04-623, 2005 Ark. LEXIS 519 (Ark. Sept. 29, 2005).
112 ARK. CONST. art. IL § 21
13 See Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304 (1999) (overturning probation condition banishing
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the parole condition without any analysis of the appropriateness of its
terms.' 14 Instead, the court deferred to the legislatively granted
discretionary powers of the parole board and emphasized that the
convict had no right to parole. 15 Under such circumstances, "[i]f the
conditions are too onerous, appellant could decline to accept the
conditions set, and elect to serve out his sentence instead.""
' 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court is far from alone in its conclusion
that parole conditions are presumptively valid due to the voluntary
nature of the agreements 17 On one level, this conclusion seems
intuitively correct, considering that the alternative to parole is to serve
out the length of one's sentence in prison. If the state can restrict a
criminal's freedom via imprisonment, it seems logical that the state
can choose to free a criminal under the less restrictive condition that
the criminal absent him or herself from certain broad geographical
areas. Of course, this is simply to reiterate that states naturally have
the power to banish individuals, at least within certain parts of the
state. However, simply because the state is under no obligation to
offer prisoners parole does not mean that the conditions of parole
should be effectively beyond judicial review. The fact that a parolee
voluntarily agrees to a banishment condition likewise should not
insulate the condition from proper review. In Carchedi v. Rhodes, the
court noted that even though an individual cannot always be said to
have made a voluntary choice when bargaining with the state, parole
agreements are trustworthy because the choices are so clear that the
parolee is capable of making an intelligent independent decision.1 18
Thus the court, upon finding a voluntary agreement, upheld a
banishment condition despite "serious reservations . . . as to whether
these intrusions into Carchedi's rights are truly necessary and proper
to further the state's legitimate interest in supervising released
felons."'9
The court in Carchedi did not review the appropriateness of the
parole conditions because it found that the appellant had waived those
defendant from state for seven years).
114Dougan, 2005 Ark. LEXIS at *4.
115 Id.
tl61d.
117See Carchedi v. Rhodes, 560 F. Supp. 1010, 1016-17 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (upholding
parole condition banishing appellant from state of Ohio for forty year duration of sentence and
holding that appellant waived his constitutional rights by voluntarily accepting the agreement);
Beavers v. State, 666 So. 2d 868, 871-72 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that banishment
condition did not violate Alabama constitutional prohibition against exile because appellant
voluntarily agreed to the parole conditions).
118560 F. Supp at 1017 n.4.
119id. at 1016.
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rights that were implicated by the banishment order. California courts
have reached a different conclusion in the course of invalidating
banishment orders. According to California jurisprudence,
"[a]lthough a defendant may waive rights which exist for his own
benefit, he may not waive those which belong also to the public
generally." 120 Thus in California, "[t]he fact that a defendant has the
right to refuse probation does not preclude attack on an improper term
of probation." 121 The logic in California rests on the notion that
banishment implicates the fundamental right to travel.1 22 If we accept
this notion, it seems clear a probationer's or parolee's willingness to
have this right abridged should not place a banishment order beyond
the scope of judicial review. A fundamental right exists for the benefit
of all citizens: a violation of such a right against one citizen, whether
acquiesced in or not, is a violation of the right itself, thereby affecting
all citizens. This is not to say that parolees and probationers cannot
have their fundamental rights restricted. 123 However, restriction
should be subject to judicial scrutiny regardless of whether they have
been agreed to or not. Moreover, despite the Carchedi court's
insistence that parolees given a choice between banishment and
further imprisonment are faced with an uncomplicated decision, it
seems clear that few inmates would choose to stay in jail. 124 Thus,
there is no real reason to trust the voluntariness of a parolees, or
probationers, decision to accept banishment. Accordingly, all
banishment orders, whether imposed by a court or executive agency,
and whether agreed to or not, should be subject to judicial review if
and when the parolee or probationer objects to the conditions.
This conclusion is bolstered by the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. This doctrine holds that "a government may not grant a
benefit with the condition that the recipient forego a constitutionally
protected right, even if the government has no duty, in the first place,
to provide the benefit."'' 25  Scholars have noted that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been applied unevenly by
courts and that it is difficult to predict if and when the doctrine will be
120 People v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (quoting People v.
Werwee, 112 Cal. App. 2d 494, 500 (1952)).
121 In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (1979).
122 The issue of whether there is a fundamental right of intrastate travel is addressed infra
section IV(C).
123 See In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 567 ("Like all constitutional rights the right of free
movement is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest.").
124 See COHEN, supra note 48, at 7-54 (noting that an "offender, faced with the possibility
of avoiding prison, usually requests probation or parole and is delighted to accept any
reasonable conditions.").
125 Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Mandating Norplant
for Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 15, 25 (1994).
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applied to a given governmental action. 126 Traditionally, the doctrine
has been used where a government has attached specific conditions
on the receipt of some government benefit such as Medicaid, food
stamps, and tax exemptions. 127 However, as professor Richard Epstein
has observed, "[t]he problem of unconstitutional conditions arises
whenever a government seeks to achieve its desired result by
obtaining bargained-for consent of the party whose conduct is to be
restricted." 128 Although this doctrine has not been applied to
conditions attached to probation or parole, banishment conditions fit
well within the doctrine's conceptual framework. In the case of
banishment, the benefit conferred on the offender is freedom from jail
or prison. The condition that the offenders "consent" to is banishment
from a particular locality. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
tells us that the "voluntary" nature of the agreement does not place
the constitutionality of the agreed to conditions beyond judicial
review. One of the factors that trigger the doctrine is the coercion
involved in the bargained for agreement. As previously noted, there
are numerous reasons to doubt the "voluntariness" of a parolee's
agreement to accept a banishment order. While the state may not be
coercing the parolee in any overt manner, the unequal bargaining
position of the parties arguably makes the agreement coercive.
Moreover, even if acquiescence in banishment is not coercive, I
would side with those who argue that "analysis of whether the
doctrine applies ends by determining if a condition is affecting a
constitutionally protected right."' 129 Because there is a fundamental
right to intrastate travel, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
mandates that banishment orders issued as a condition of probation or
parole be subject to judicial scrutiny regarding the validity of the
conditions themselves.
130
B. Abuse of Discretion Versus Strict Scrutiny
Banishment orders, where objected to, should in all cases be
subject to judicial review. The issue is thus presented: at what level of
1261d. at 34-35; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 5, 13
(1988) (characterizing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as "unruly").
127 See generally Epstein, supra note 126, at 73-102 (discussing the application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to conditions attached to government benefits).
128 Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
129 Id. at 36.
130 The important point here is that the "voluntariness" of consent to a banishment order
does not place such orders beyond judicial review. This is not to suggest that the constitutional
conditions doctrine mandates strict judicial scrutiny of banishment orders. The appropriate level
of review is addressed infra Part III(C).
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judicial review should banishment orders be scrutinized? The courts
disagree as to whether the appropriate standard is a heightened form
of scrutiny, or whether the orders should simply be reviewed under
the level of review typical for the type of government action taken.
Although the courts do not always address the issue, the level of
scrutiny they apply is generally determined by whether or not the
courts recognize a constitutional right of intrastate travel.
Because most banishment orders are issued as a condition of
probation or parole, most banishment orders are first, if not
exclusively, reviewed in light of the purposes of probation and parole.
Because probation conditions are imposed on a discretionary basis by
trial courts, banishment orders are often subjected to an abuse of
discretion review.131 Under this standard, the reviewing courts set out
to determine if the trial court imposed the banishment conditions for
valid probationary reasons. For example, in upholding a condition
banishing a convicted drug dealer from Fulton County, Georgia, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Cothran held
that a district court does not abuse its discretion in imposing a
probation condition "so long as it is reasonably related to
rehabilitation of the probationer, protection of the public against other
offenses during its term, deterrence of future misconduct by the
probationer or general deterrence of others .... or some combination
of these objectives. ' 32 The court then found that because the
defendant had committed all his crimes in Fulton County, the
banishment was reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation as
it removed him from a corrupting environment and allowed him to
start a new life.' 33 The Cothran court is not alone in analyzing
banishment orders solely under an abuse of discretion review that
examines if the condition complies with the requirements of
probationary or parole conditions.1 34 Importantly, the standards
131 See, e.g., United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 751 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("In reviewing
the district court's decision to impose the specific condition of probation contested by the
defendant [banishment from Fulton County, Georgia], this court must determine if the district
court abused its discretion."); People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Colo. 1997)
(reviewing probation order banishing defendant from town under "the applicable standard of
review which requires an abuse of discretion by the trial court to occasion any modification of
the trial court's sentence").
132 Cothran, 855 F.2d at 751 (quoting United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir.
1979)); see also State v. Muhammad, 43 P.3d 318, 323 (Mont. 2002) (overturning banishment
condition, stating "we must analyze whether the banishment condition is reasonably related to
the objective of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society to determine whether
the condition is within the parameters provided by statute").
133 Cothran, 855 F.2d at 752.
134See, e.g., United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 290 (3rd Cir. 2000) (upholding a
two-county ban against a convicted prostitute under both an abuse of discretion and plain error
standard).
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governing probationary and parole conditions are not always without
teeth. 35 For example, in Colorado, courts judge the validity of
probationary geographical restrictions based on the relation of the
restrictions to rehabilitation; the severity of the restrictions in
reference to where the defendant resides and works; whether there are
less restrictive means available; and whether the defendant can
petition the court to relax the restrictions. 36 A sentencing court
abuses its discretion if it imposes conditions that conflict in whole or
in part with these considerations. However, my own research suggests
that courts that apply only an abuse of discretion review are more
likely to uphold banishment conditions, 37 especially courts that do
not recognize a constitutional right to intrastate travel.
38
However, many courts, when reviewing banishment orders, do
recognize that such orders implicate important constitutional rights
and therefore apply a heightened level of review. California courts are
at the forefront in this regard. For example, one California appellate
court has held that "the right to intrastate travel (which includes
intra-municipal travel) is a basic human right protected by the United
States and California Constitutions as a whole."'139 This court then
went on to invalidate a probation order banning a convicted prostitute
from a substantial portion of a California municipality. In so doing,
the court held that broad geographical restriction should by viewed
skeptically and that where "available alternative means exist which
are less violative of the constitutional right and are narrowly drawn so
as to correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated, those
alternatives should be used." 4° In other words, geographical
restrictions should be narrowly tailored or avoided altogether where
other means of achieving the desired objective are available.
California is hardly alone in recognizing the right of intrastate
travel, and thus applying heightened scrutiny to banishment orders.'
41
135 See COHEN, supra note 48, at 10-17 (noting that banishment orders are often
overturned for serving neither rehabilitation nor public-protection functions).
136 People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315, 1319 (1997).
137 See id.; United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289 (3rd Cir. 2000); United States v. Cothran,
855 F.2d 749 (11 th Cir. 1998); State v. Nienhardt, 537 N.W.2d 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (all of
which upheld substantial geographic conditions based solely on an abuse of discretion
standard); supra notes 98-101.
138 See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying rational basis in
upholding an order issued by a public housing authority banning plaintiff from all public
housing operated by authority); Doe v. City of Lafayette, 160 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ind. 2001),
rev'd, 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003), rev'd en banc, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying
rational basis in upholding order issued by parks department banning plaintiff from all city
parks).
139 1n re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
140Id. at 568.
141 See In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 763-64 (I. App. Ct. 2003) (recognizing the right of
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A Washington appellate court in State v. Schimelpfenig articulated
this standard most succinctly, holding that banishment orders "must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."'
' 42
In practice, courts that recognize the constitutional implication of
banishment orders do not always reach the constitutionality of such
orders. Often, for example, the orders are struck down for not
complying with the requirements of probation statutes; in which case
the courts do not need to address the constitutionality of the
conditions. 143 Moreover, the application of heightened scrutiny is
often comparable to abuse of discretion reviews requiring that
banishment orders be reasonably related to the goals of probation.
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois has defined a
reasonable condition of probation as one that is not "overly broad
when viewed in the light of the desired goal or the means to that
end."' 44 However, this should not undermine the importance of
applying the correct level of scrutiny to banishment orders. Where
fundamental constitutional rights are impinged upon by government
action, courts must knowingly and conspicuously apply a heightened
level of judicial scrutiny. The central question then, with regard to the
type of review courts should apply to banishment orders, is whether
there exists a fundamental right to intrastate travel.
C. The Right of Intrastate Travel
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 45 the Supreme Court recognized the right
of interstate travel. According to the Court, federalism and the
concept of liberty "unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes,
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this
movement."' 46 The Court then struck down a statute that denied
welfare assistance to individuals who had not resided for at least one
year in the jurisdiction in which they applied for welfare. In so doing,
intrastate travel and holding that banishment conditions must therefore be narrowly drawn);
State v. Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 2000) (stating that banishment orders implicate
fundamental rights and are therefore reviewed carefully); Halsted v. Sallee, 639 P.2d 877, 879
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing the right to travel and holding that infringements upon such
a fundamental right requires a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring).
142 115 P.3d 338, 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
143See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 43 P.3d 318, 324 (Mont. 2002) ("Since we have
determined that the banishment condition is not reasonably related to the goals of rehabilitation
and the protection of the victim and society in violation of § 46-18-202(1)(e), MCA (1997), we
will not address [the] constitutional arguments.").
144 In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 764.
145 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
146 Id. at 629.
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the Court held that "any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right [of interstate travel], unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional. 147 Accordingly, government action that infringes
upon an individual's exercise of the right of interstate travel must be
reviewed under a heightened level of scrutiny requiring the
infringement of this right be "necessary" to achieve a governmental
interest that is "compelling." Although the Court has reaffirmed the
existence of the right of interstate travel on several occasions, the
Court has declined to comment on whether there exists a concomitant
right of intrastate travel.
Because the Supreme Court has not specifically commented,
federal and state courts have disagreed as to whether a right of
intrastate travel exists under the Constitution. A number of courts that
have declined to recognize the right of intrastate travel have
effectively relied upon the Supreme Court's silence as the basis for
declining to recognize such a right. In Thompson v. Ashe,148 the Sixth
Circuit upheld a public housing authority order banning the plaintiff
from setting foot in any public housing facility within the authority's
boundaries. The plaintiff argued this order violated his freedom of
movement but the court held that "the 'right to travel,' as recognized
by our jurisprudence ... is essentially a right of interstate travel." 149
Rather than independently analyze whether intrastate travel is
protected, the Thompson court simply cited precedent explicating the
right of interstate travel and held that because the plaintiff was only
restricted intrastate, the plaintiff's freedom of travel claim failed. 50
The Thompson court is not alone in dismissing the right of intrastate
travel with little analysis of the potential source of such a right. For
example, in Doe v. City of Lafayette,151 the federal district court found
the Thompson court's rationale persuasive in holding itself that there
is no right of intrastate travel. The Fifth Circuit has similarly refused
to recognize a right of intrastate travel with little analysis. 52 Instead,
the court held that "nothing in Shapiro or any of its progeny stands
for the proposition that there is a fundamental constitutional 'right to
commute' which would cause the compelling governmental purpose
test enunciated in Shapiro to apply."
' 153
147 Id. at 634.
14 250 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2001).
149 Id. at 406.
15O Id.
151 60 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 2001).
152 Wright v. Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
153Id. at 902.
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Notwithstanding the lack of Supreme Court precedent, a number
of state and federal courts have recognized the right of intrastate
travel. As previously noted, several California courts have explicitly
recognized this right. 54 Additionally, state courts in Washington,
1 55
Wyoming, Wisconsin, Hawaii, Minnesota, and New York have all
recognized the right of free travel within their respective states. 56
Although these states locate this right within their own respective
state constitutions, these holdings support the position that the right of
intrastate travel is a fundamental right. Federal courts have also
recognized a right of intrastate travel emanating from the federal
Constitution. Interestingly, notwithstanding its 2001 holding in
Thompson, the Sixth Circuit revisited the issue in 2002 in Johnson v.
Cincinnati and held that the Due Process Clause does in fact protect
the right of intrastate travel, which the court characterized as "the
right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways."1' 57 Unlike
the Thompson court a year earlier, the Johnson court surveyed
historical notions of liberty and the jurisprudence surrounding
freedom of travel and grounded its holding on "the historical
endorsement of a right to intrastate travel and the practical necessity
of such a right."'' 58 The Johnson court did not feel bound by
Thompson because it read that Thompson "says only that neither this
court nor the Supreme Court has formally recognized a limited right
to intrastate travel."' 59 When the Johnson court systematically
addressed the issue, it unequivocally recognized this right. At issue in
Johnson was a city ordinance excluding individuals arrested for
certain crimes from appearing in public in designated drug-exclusion
zones. Because the ordinance infringed upon the right of intrastate
travel, the court applied strict scrutiny and invalidated the ordinance
because it was not narrowly tailored.' 6'
The Supreme Court's unwillingness to comment on the right of
intrastate travel leaves the existence of such a right open to debate.
Indeed, the Court denied certiorari on Johnson and thereby forwent a
14See, e.g., In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (overturning order
banishing defendant from significant portions of municipality); People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr.
381, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (overturning intrastate banishment order).
155 State v. Schimelpfenig, No. 31012-1-11, 2005 WL 1523678, at *** 4 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 29, 2005).
156 See Johnson v. Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 496 n.3 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing cases from the
above mentioned states that recognize the right of intrastate travel).
157 Id. at 498.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 495.
160Id. at 487.
161 Id. at 505.
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clear opportunity to resolve the issue. 16 2 However, the fact that the
Court has not explicitly recognized the right to intrastate travel does
not dictate that the right does not exist.
To begin with, a very strong argument can be made that such a
right implicitly emanates from the right of interstate travel. The
Second Circuit acknowledged this when it noted that "it would be
meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a
fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a
correlative constitutional right to travel within a state." 163 Essentially,
the right of interstate travel would go unprotected if states could
restrict travel within their borders. One's freedom to travel to a
neighboring state would be useless if one were not free to pass
through any of the counties bordering that state. In fact, the Johnson
court found this argument to be irrefutable and declined to rest its
holding on these grounds only because the Supreme Court has "not
yet definitely located the textual source of the right to interstate
travel."'164 Instead, Johnson rested its holding on an independent due
process analysis.
To decide whether a given right is protected by the Due Process
Clause, the Court has inquired if it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed."'165 At the onset, it seems clear that the concept of liberty
implicitly includes the freedom to travel locally through the public
spaces and roadways of the state. Were a state to prohibit its citizens
to travel from one county to the next, few would deny that the liberty
of the citizens had been impinged. Liberty implies freedom, and
freedom implies the ability to travel within and beyond the borders of
the state. Additionally, the Johnson court presents a compelling
argument that the right of intrastate travel has historically been
recognized and protected. For example, Johnson cites to a 1920 case
in which the Court noted that since the Articles of Confederation,
state citizens "possessed the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of
all free governments ... to move at will from place to place [within
their respective states] .,,166 The Johnson court also cites to nineteenth
century opinions by Chief Justice Taney and Justice Harlan, which
162 Cincinatti v. Johnson, 539 U.S. 915 (2003).
163Johrson, 310 F.3d at 498 n.4 (quoting King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442
F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971)).
164Id.
165 Id. at 495 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
166Id. at 497 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920)).
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both recognized the right of intrastate travel.167 Indeed, for Justice
Harlan, citing Blackstone, "personal liberty consists ... in the power
of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to
whatever place one's inclination may direct, without restraint, unless
,168by due course of law." Beyond these opinions, Johnson goes on to
cite a number of contemporary state and federal courts that have
either recognized a general right to travel, or the specific right of
intrastate travel. 169 "In light of these cases," the Johnson court
correctly held "that the right to travel locally through public spaces
and roadways enjoys a unique and protected place in our national
heritage." 170
There can be no doubt that a banishment order infringes upon an
individual's fundamental right of intrastate travel. However, one may
note that incarceration is itself the ultimate restriction upon this right.
Imprisonment, by its very nature, extinguishes an individual's
freedom of travel. Banishment orders issued in lieu of imprisonment
are in fact lesser restrictions on the right of intrastate travel than the
prison terms they supplant. Generally, prison sentences are not
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Arguably then, a banishment
order, which involves a lesser infringement on the right of intrastate
travel, should likewise not be held to a heightened level of review.
171
If the greater power of imprisonment is not subject to strict scrutiny,
why should the lesser power of banishment be so subjected? The
answer is twofold. In the first, a banishment order issued as a
condition of probation or parole may be viewed as an independent
government action. A sentencing court has the choice of imposing
imprisonment or probation (just as a parole board has a choice
between continuing incarceration or offering parole). The fact that a
court elects to impose probation and to utilize banishment as a
probationary condition does not dictate that any analysis of these
conditions must be subsumed by the fact that the court could have
sent the offender to prison. In reality, by banishing an offender
eligible for imprisonment a sentencing court concludes that for
whatever reason, the offender should not be sent to prison.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the offender should retain more
of his or her individual rights, including the right of intrastate travel,
167 Id. (citing Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 39 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
168 Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 39) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 Id. at 496-98.
170 Id. at 497-98.
171 See Smith, supra note 30, at 582-86 (arguing that banishment orders should not be
subject to strict scrutiny).
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than the imprisoned convict. The fact that a sentencing court chooses
not to imprison an offender represents a judgment that the offender
should not have his or her freedom of intrastate travel totally
restricted. The decision to banish the offender then represents an
independent judgment by the court as to the appropriate restrictions
on the offender's individual rights. Therefore, the decision to banish
an individual as a condition of probation or parole represents an
independent government act, conceptually distinct from the power of
the government to imprison that individual. Because a banishment
order by definition infringes upon the offender's fundamental right of
intrastate travel, a right that a court implicitly acknowledges the
offender retains when the court chooses against imprisonment, such
orders should always be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
There is also a strong process and policy based reason to subject
judicially and executively imposed banishment orders to strict
scrutiny even where the greater power to imprison the defendant
would not be subject to such review. When an offender is sent to
prison, communities other than those directly impacted by the
offender and the offense have a somewhat remote and general interest
in the sentence. These interests are limited primarily to a general
interest in state law enforcement and a pecuniary interest in the cost
of the imprisonment system. However, where a banishment order has
been issued, communities outside those directly affected by the crime
or criminal may be burdened by having the offender live and work
among them. While these communities may be so burdened, they
have no voice in the sentencing decision. Heightened judicial scrutiny
may the be the best means to protect the interests of communities
forced to house banished offenders by ensuring that banishment
orders will only be imposed in narrowly drawn terms. Moreover, as
previously noted in Part I (B), banishment orders are liable to create
inter-community dissension and retaliation. If county "X" becomes
aware that its neighboring county "Y" has been banishing criminals
and these criminals have been ending up in county X, county X may
well become antagonistic towards its neighbor and regional
cooperation may be imperiled. While such a situation does not offend
the federal Constitution, 72 it is nevertheless undesirable. Strict
scrutiny of banishment orders may thus be necessary to ensure that it
is not overly-employed to the above described effect. Moreover, such
scrutiny may help allay concerns of outlying communities that
banishment is being imposed indiscriminately. In short, strict judicial
scrutiny of banishment orders may be necessary to mollify the
17 2 See supra Part 1(B).
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potential inter-community strife that banishment orders might
engender.
CONCLUSION
Banishment orders clearly infringe upon the fundamental right to
"travel locally through public spaces and roadways." Just as the
Supreme Court subjects state action that infringes upon the right of
interstate travel to strict scrutiny, banishment orders should likewise
be subject to this heightened level of review. Moreover, intrastate
banishment orders implicate concerns about inter-local dumping of
criminals that independently suggests a need for strict judicial
scrutiny of such orders. A banishment order should only be upheld
when it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Because most banishment orders are issued as conditions of probation
or parole, the compelling interest element will often be a formality.
Probation and parole conditions must be aimed at rehabilitating the
offender and protecting the public, both of which are clearly
compelling state interests. The importance of strict scrutiny in this
context is to require that banishment orders be narrowly tailored to
serve these interests. In making this judgment, courts should consider
the smallest geographical banishment area that will effectively serve
to remove the offender from corrupting influences and that will
adequately protect victims from unwanted contact with the offender.
Courts should also consider the offender's economic and social ties to
the area from which he or she is to be banished: if the offender has
family in that area or is employed in that area, banishment may be
inappropriate. Finally, in almost all cases, courts should require
procedures by which individuals can temporarily enter banishment
zones for specific and limited purposes. Ultimately, applying strict
scrutiny to banishment orders strikes an effective balance between the
state's need for penological flexibility and every individual's
constitutional right to both interstate and intrastate travel.
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